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Vertical restrictions have theoretically ambiguous efficiency effects. Marketplace evidence is therefore 
required to reveal the presence of anti-competitive foreclosure. The bundling of mobile phones with 
cellular network service offers one such market test. Two European nations—Finland and Belgium—
prohibited tying arrangements for mobile service and mobile devices (handsets) in wireless broadband 
(3G) markets. These rules were abandoned in 2006 and 2010, respectively, creating natural experiments.  
This article compares 3G subscribership in European countries from 2003 through 2012. Finland and 
Belgium, while banning bundles, exhibited 3G penetration levels only about a third of the EU 15 average.  
Following their respective regime switches, relative 3G penetration levels improved markedly in these 
countries—Finland, in fact, became an EU leader. Regressions adjusting for market specific factors 
quantify the effects. The data are consistent with the view that carrier handset subsidies, which are 
strongly supported by bundling services with hardware, help internalize network effects that, if 
unsupported by the network carriers, may go unrealized. Vertical integration here appears to assist in 
productive ecosystem creation, not anti-competitive foreclosure. 
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Today, the efficiency benefits of vertical restraints are frequently questioned in the mobile phone sector. 
In particular, the practice of tying mobile phone subscriptions with handset sales—often with large carrier 
subsidies lowering the price of the phone with the signing of a two-year service contract—has attracted 
critical scrutiny. The primary concern is that such contract bundles foreclose competition between mobile 
operators, original equipment manufacturers (OEMs), and vendors of content and applications in ways 
that harm consumers (Frieden 2007; Wu 2007; Crawford 2013).  These foreclosure concerns contrast with 
findings by economists and antitrust experts who note that vertical integration in mobile markets allow for 
pro-competitive efficiencies that benefit consumers (Faulhaber & Farber 2010; Heatley & Howell 2009; 
Liebowitz & Margolis 2008; Ford et al. 2009; Hahn et al. 2007; Schwartz & Mini 2007). Economists have 
noted potential efficiencies in upstream inputs of the mobile network (Mayo & Wallsten 2010), and 
economists conducting laboratory experiments have found that bundling is efficient, extending consumer 
welfare (Caliskan et al. 2007). In other industries, empirical studies have measured efficiencies from non-
price vertical conduct as well (Cooper et al. 2005). Customers may lose some choices when differentiated 
goods are packaged into retail combinations (Liebowitz & Margolis 2008), but overall there is social 
welfare gain from bundled products. Importantly, there now exist natural experiments, or quasi-
experiments, allowing us to observe the effects of mobile handset bundling between 2003 and 2012.  In 
both Finland and Belgium, national governments prohibited mobile carriers from bundling handsets with 
services, but later reversed the policies. The use, and then removal, of these regulations yield valuable 
evidence from European markets.  
 
 
2  Handset Bundling and Subsidies in Mobile Service Contracts 
 
Mobile telecommunications services are typically sold either pre-paid or post-paid.  In the former, the 
customer generally buys a mobile phone and a card yielding a fixed supply of minutes.  The mobile carrier 
is then obligated to deliver the service purchased.  As minutes are used, new cards are bought.  When the 
phone becomes obsolete, as per the introduction of newer models, the wireless user elects when to buy a 
new device, again paying for the unit directly.  In the post-paid contract, the customer commits to paying a 
monthly bill over a period of time, often two years.  In exchange, the mobile network commits to a given 
pricing schedule.  In addition, the carrier typically subsidizes the cost of the handset or other device that 
the subscriber uses to access the network.  When these handset subsidies are in place, the contract 
mandates a term of service, a period during which the carrier will be “paid back” for the phone. (Monetary 
payments – “early termination fees” – are included should the subscriber exit the contract early.)  This 
form of contract combines the sale of handsets and wireless services, possibly achieving efficiencies.  
Alternatively, the “tying arrangement” may be part of a strategy by networks to foreclose competition in a 
complementary market (Farrell & Weiser 2003).  The ambiguous nature of the theory calls for empirical 
investigation of the sort conducted in the analysis here. 
 
We first note that there are some obvious and some not-so-obvious sources of bundling efficiency.  
Economies in joint provision, either through vertical integration or contract, of phones and services may 
exist due to the important coordination needed between handsets and cellular network infrastructure.  
Handsets – mobile radios which communicate with fixed base stations – are “part of the wireless network” 
(Jackson 2007, p. 1).  To work properly, all network devices must be synchronized, using the same basic 
technology. They must also share network resources, including radio spectrum and innovation platforms 
(like “app stores”), so as to optimize usage. This introduces the possibility of externalities, from costs of 
coordination in quality and technology1. 
                                                 
1   As described in a recent antitrust opinion, In re Wireless Telephone Services Antitrust Lit., 385 F.Supp.2d 403 (2005), 
http://www.leagle.com/decision/2005788385FSupp2d403_1752: “The quality of handsets available to subscribers is particularly 
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A carrier may internalize such inter-user effects, mitigating them by asserting some level of vertical 
control over the handsets used on its network. This includes the investment in new, complementary 
facilities or services. In this sense, the wireless operator internalizes externalities by contracting and 
coordinating with handset manufacturers to provide retail bundles (Liebowitz & Margolis 1994). In many 
retail goods and services, bundled products are pervasive, as opposed to fully unbundled inputs (Liebowitz 
& Margolis 2008). Changing demands, technologies and business models also impact the nature of 
vertical integration (Liebowitz & Margolis 2008). In 2013, the fourth-largest U.S. mobile carrier, T-
Mobile, recently switched from a subsidy model to an unbundled, “bring your own phone,” sales model2.  
The anti-efficiency explanation of handset bundling sees this form of organization as competitive 
foreclosure (Frieden 2007; Wu 2007; Crawford 2013). Strategic foreclosure theory says that a dominant 
firm excludes competing firms by tying an upstream product with a downstream product, resulting in less 
output and higher prices. This theory has been empirically tested in non-technology distribution networks 
(Cooper et al. 2005), and cable programming (Suzuki 2009).  
 
 
3 Anti-Bundling Regulation in Finland and Belgium 
 
The standard manner in which wireless carriers market 3G services involves the sale of a bundled 
contract: the customer is offered a handset and a service agreement, usually for one or two years. 
Typically, the carrier subsidizes the handsets sold in this manner quite heavily, lowering the customer’s 
upfront payment, sometimes to zero, and recoups the subsidy over the term of the contract. 
Telecommunications regulators in Finland and Belgium forbade this business practice, however. These 
regulations faced popular opposition and legal challenges, and both countries eventually reversed their 
policies. Finland was first, in 2006, followed by Belgium in 2010. 
 
3.1  Finland’s Prohibition of Bundled Handsets, 1997-2006 
 
A Finnish law prohibiting handset-service bundles, dating to 1997, was reiterated in the Communications 
Market Act of 2003. This ensured that the major Finnish carriers, Elisa, Sonera, and DNA, were unable to 
sell handsets with mobile service, allowing independent vendors to retail handsets directly to customers. 
Regulators viewed these anti-bundling mandates as consumer protection measures that provided pricing 
transparency (Gimeno et al. 2007, p. 7).  Unsubsidized phones meant high upfront outlays for handsets, 
relative to the alternative, and demand was reportedly diminished by consumer frustration with service, 
which resulted from the anti-bundling policy (Saarikoski 2006, p. 64). Consumers had a difficult time 
connecting their handsets to the wireless network, given the forced independence—and lack of 
coordination—between device manufacturers and mobile carriers. When consumers did have issues, the 
OEMs instructed consumers to contact the carriers, and the carriers would often blame the OEMs (Id.). 
This lack of coordination between carriers and OEMs also meant it was the responsibility of the consumer 
to know if there was service availability in his area for particular handset models. In 2005, regulators 
reversed course and agreed that carrier-subsidized handsets—a complement to wireless networks—would 
increase investment in the networks and help create useful ecosystems for data services, benefiting 
consumers. That year, the Finnish communications regulator asked the Finnish parliament to change to the 
law to allow for bundling. Deregulation went into effect in April 20063 (Tallberg et al. 2007, p. 652). 
                                                                                                                                                              
important to the service providers because the use of ‘outmoded’ handsets not only affects the quality of that subscriber's service, 
but also diminishes the quality of service to other subscribers. As a result, at least two of the defendants, Verizon Wireless and 
AT&T Wireless, subject or have subjected handset models to an approval process involving testing and maintain a list of models 
approved for use with their respective services.” 
2 T-Mobile USA Reports First Quarter 2013 Results, 8 May, 2013. http://newsroom.t-mobile.com/phoenix.zhtml? 
c=251624&p=irol-newsArticle&ID=1816790.  




3.2  Belgium’s Prohibition on Combined Offers, 1991-2010 
 
A more complex story of deregulation and re-regulation has transpired in Belgium. Traditionally, bundled 
products were generally prohibited throughout the Belgian economy. Tying prohibitions dating to the 
1930s were renewed by the 1991 Trade Practices Act, establishing Belgium’s anti-bundling 
(koppelverkoop) law4. Hence, tying a mobile handset with a subscription was illegal. The law was 
ostensibly intended to promote competition and protect consumers from being lured into purchasing 
products like subsidized phones5. With the release of the iPhone 3G in 2008, Belgians saw that their 
European neighbors were purchasing far cheaper advanced phones.  Headlines, in fact, declared Belgium 
home to “The World’s Most Expensive iPhone”6. The source of Belgians’ discontent is apparent, as they 
paid higher upfront costs relative to consumers in other countries in 2008 as listed in Table 1. Popular 
opinion and political momentum shifted to lift bundling restrictions.   
 
 
Country Carrier 8GB 16GB Plan Min. SMS Data Contract 
Belgium Mobistar $822 $963 $47 180 300 200MB 24 mo.* 
Canada Rogers $199 $299 $60 150 75 400MB 36 mo. 
Denmark Telia $298 $426 $128 300 Unlimited 300MB 6 mo. 
Finland Sonera $250 $385 $50 100 100 100MB 24 mo. 
Germany T-Mobile $94 $236 $77 100 40 Unlimited 24 mo. 
Hong Kong Three $377 $479 $24 500 Unlimited 500MB 24 mo. 
Ireland O2 $265 $360 $71 175 100 1GB 18 mo. 
Italy Vodafone $313 $423 $93 400 400 600MB 24 mo. 
Italy TIM $312 $422 $47 0 0 1GB 24 mo. 
Mexico Telcel $331 $454 $44 200 100 100MB 24 mo. 
Netherlands T-Mobile $126 $252 $47 150 150 Unlimited 24 mo. 
New Zealand Vodafone $414 $527 $60 120 600 250MB 24 mo. 
Norway NetCom $275 $452 $79 100 100 100MB 12 mo.**
Portugal Vodafone - - $47 100 100 250MB 24 mo. 
Sweden Telia $284 $451 $50 100 100 100MB 24 mo. 
Switzerland Orange $199 $249 $44 30 50 1GB 24 mo. 
Switzerland Swisscom $249 $349 $25 - - 100MB 24 mo. 
UK O2 $196 $315 $59 75 125 Unlimited 18 mo. 
US AT&T $199 $299 $70 450 - Unlimited 24 mo. 
 
Table 1.  iPhone 3G Prices and Plans (Van Beijnum 2008)7. *Belgium did not allow bundling in 
2008. **estimated. 
 
Policymakers believed that the absence of handset bundles in Belgium depressed consumer demand for 
advanced mobile handsets. In July 2008, Vincent Van Quickenborne, a Belgian economics minister, 
aggressively sought the elimination of the bundling ban, citing expensive handset prices8. Industry 
                                                 
4 De Wit, John, Senaat Stemt Nieuwe Wet Op Consumentenbescherming. Gazet Van Antwerpen, 29 March, 2010. 
5 Mobistar to Sell Unlocked iPhone. Reuters, 8 July, 2008. http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/07/08/us-mobistar-iphone-
idUSL0859270920080708.   
6 Belgium Has the World’s Most Expensive iPhone, Flanders News.be, 2008. http://www.deredactie.be/cm/ 
vrtnieuws.english/news/1.339616.  See also Quirk in Belgian Law Drives iPhones near $1,000, USA Today, 9 July, 2008. 
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/tech/products/2008-07-09-75332351_x.htm. 
7 Van Beijnum, Iljitsch. Unlocked iPhones in Belgium Make Locking Look Good. Ars Technica, 8 July, 2008. 
http://arstechnica.com/apple/2008/07/unlocked-iphones-in-belgium-make-locking-look-good/.  
8 Deckmyn, Dominique. Van Quickenborne: Verbod Koppelverkoop Zorgt Voor Dure iPhone (trans., Google Translate). 
ZDNet.be, 8 July, 2008. http://www.zdnet.be/iphone/87894/van-quickenborne-verbod-koppelverkoop-zorgt-voor-dure-iphone/.   
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analysts attributed slow uptake of mobile handsets to the anti-bundling law9. No tying meant difficulties 
for carriers to offer bundles of services (amounts of voice, SMS, data) with handset subsidies to increase 
subscription rates10. Van Quickenborne’s campaign against the bundling regulations worked. On April 23, 
2009, the Court of Justice of the European Union ruled that the EU’s Unfair Commercial Practices 
Directive 2005/29/EC preempted the law that prohibited combined offers to consumers11 (EC 2013). On 
March 18, 2010, the Belgian Senate repealed the Fair Trade Practices Act and approved a New Consumer 
Protection Act12. Belgian mobile carriers were free to offer handsets combined with wireless service.  
 
 
4  Empirical Approach  
 
4.1  Inferences from Consumer Adoption 
 
This study infers the welfare effects of mobile bundling policy through 3G subscribership over 40 quarters 
(2003Q1 to 2012Q4) in 27 countries. Output effects from increased uptake can provide evidence of 
efficiencies from non-price vertical conduct. Here, we investigate whether change in output is observed 
following deregulation of anti-bundling rules. If change in output is positive, the implication is that 
bundling has increased social welfare. Anti-competitive foreclosure would suggest the reverse, a 
restriction in output, and hence, welfare.  
 
We consider 3G penetration levels as a standard measure of output, where consumers are more likely to 
adopt services with handset bundles.  Price effects are not measured here since the variety of components 
within a handset-service price bundle has changed over time.  As seen in Table 1 above, prices and 
quantity for voice minutes, SMS text, data, contract length, and handset models vary widely. Price bundles 
have adjusted to shifts in consumer preferences between 2003 and 2012, where consumer demand has 
changed rapidly with respect to user applications and behavior (FCC 2013).  Our model does not define or 
track changes within bundles, and limits its observations to 3G penetration rates. 
 
4.2  Simple Time Series Data 
 
In Figure 1, we observe quarterly 3G subscribership from 2003 to 2012, a time frame that focuses on the 
post-iPhone 3G era. The figure shows 3G connections per 100 people for each EU 15 country.  The 
Wireless Intelligence Database of the GSM Association includes quarterly data on 3G connections and 
covariates for 27 EU countries for 1,080 observations. We designate control groups as EU 15/27 countries 
excluding Finland or Belgium. EU 15 countries have higher mean gross national product in current prices 
than the remaining EU 27 countries. Finland and Belgium are both EU 15 countries, which also include 
Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, United Kingdom, Netherlands, Poland, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.  The remaining EU 27 countries include Bulgaria, 
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Romania, Slovakia, 
and Slovenia. 
 
                                                 
9 S&P: Belgacom S.A., Reuters, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/12/06/idUSWLB188620121206.  
10 Van Beijnum, Iljitsch, Unlocked iPhones in Belgium Make Locking Look Good. Ars Technica, 8 July, 2008. 
http://arstechnica.com/apple/2008/07/unlocked-iphones-in-belgium-make-locking-look-good/.  
11 Van de Velde, Antonia, EU Court Orders Belgium to Allow Retail Bundling. Reuters, 23 April, 2009. 
http://in.reuters.com/article/2009/04/23/belgium-sales-court-idINL2627016820090423.  







Figure 1.  Quarterly 3G Connections in the EU 15 from 2003Q1 – 2012Q4.   
 
4.3  Finland 
 
Almost immediately after reforms allowed handset bundling as of April 2006, Finnish mobile operators 
began offering substantially subsidized handsets tied to subscriptions (Tallberg et al. 2007, pp. 653-54). 
3G penetration in Finland rapidly expanded (Id., pp. 655-58). With the ability to subsidize 3G phones, 
mobile carriers saw a 32% increase in sales over previous year sales13. After the law change, consumers 
acquired more advanced handsets and consumed more data (Repo 2006). In turn, operators built out their 
3G networks. Greater speeds and coverage led to more demand for 3G handsets (Tallberg et al. 2007; Kivi 
2007; Okholm 2008; Howell & Sangekar 2008). By 2012, Finland had regained its reputation as a 
European leader in mobile technology with 109.9% penetration in 2012Q4, trailing only Sweden in per 
capita connections (Wireless Intelligence 2013).   
 
4.4 Belgium   
 
In Belgium, following reversal of the prohibition on combined offers, a positive but weak uptick was 
observed in 3G penetration between 2010 and 2012 as seen in Figure 3. In the second quarter of 2008, 
prior to its policy change in the second quarter of 2010, 3G penetration in Belgium trailed at 26% of the 
EU 15 average (6.09 / 23.45). In the fourth quarter of 2012, penetration remained at 65% of the EU 15 
average (44.87 / 69.37).  The relatively slow uptake compared to the EU 15 may be associated with unique 
constraints on Belgian mobile carriers.  Two additional events may explain output effects in Belgium. In 




                                                 
13 Poropudas, Timo, 3G-kännykät vetävät myyntiä (trans., Google Translate), Digitoday, 16 November, 2006. 
http://www.digitoday.fi/mobiili/2006/11/16/3g-kannykat-vetavat-myyntia/200620745/66. One scholar also wrote: “The Finnish 
Parliament allowed bundling . . . starting April 2006. In practice this has led to consumers buying subsidised 3G handsets. In 
Finland 3G has taken off because of bundling. There is a clear cause and effect relationship between allowing bundling and 3G 









Figure 3.  Belgium’s 3G Connections & EU 15 Average. 
 
Belgium required carriers to provide customers with a 6 month contract termination without penalty14. 
This mandated contract term is an outlier among developed nations, where international contracts range 
from 12 to 36 months, with 24 months the mode (OECD 2013, pp. 35-37). This law implemented the 2009 
EU Regulatory Framework for electronic communications (EC 2010, p. 104).  Until 2012, Belgian carriers 
also faced other challenges.  From 2010 to 2013, the three mobile carriers were slow to offer handset 
                                                 
14 Belgacom Group, Investors FAQ 2013. http://www.belgacom.com/be-en/annex_investors/Inv_FAQ.page; Belgium’s Telecom 




bundles, and Mobistar did not offer subsidized handsets until 201215. During those years, the three carriers 
also litigated increased license renewal fees imposed by the Belgian government, a matter they lost in 
201216, and 40% base station standards imposed by Brussels regulators17.  
 
4.5 Difference-in-Differences Approach 
 
Difference-in-differences (DD) measure economic effects with respect to country and bundling policy. We 
measure 3G connections and log 3G connections in two models: 
 
(1)  3Git =  β0 + β1Policyit + β2Countryit + β3Countryit*Policyit + Ωit + εit, and 
(2)  ln 3Git =  β0 + β1Policyit + β2Countryit + β3Countryit*Policyit + Ωit + εit, 
 
for all i = 1 to 27 countries and t = 1 to 40 quarters, where Countryit = 1 for Finland/Belgium, 0 for EU 
15/27 excl. Finland/Belgium, Policyit = 1 for after bundling, 0 for before bundling, and Countryit*Policyit 
= 1 for the interaction term of Finland/Belgium  after bundling.  Vector Ωit of covariates includes ln(HHI) 
= HHI concentration per quarter, ln(GDP) = GDP in PPS per year, ln(Density) = population density per 
quarter, 2G = 2G Connections and ln(2G) = ln(2G Connections) per quarter.  If handset bundling is part of 
a vertical scheme to foreclose competition, the implication is that bundling permissions will be correlated 
with lower output. To test this hypothesis, we set the null hypothesis, H0, as predicting that bundling 
restrictions have no effect on output, or H0: β3 = 0. Alternatively, H1, predicts the effect of bundling 
prohibitions on 3G connections to deter or promote output, or H1: β3 ≠ 0.  The difference-in-differences 
estimator, β3, will indicate the direction of differences in 3G connections as decreasing or increasing after 
the policy event.  A caveat is warranted about policy endogeneity in quasi-experiments where 
observational studies may be limited by selection bias. Here, we compare particular countries with EU 
peers. Policy endogeneity may exist in Finland or Belgium if bundling permissions were instituted in 
expectation of an anticipated rise in 3G subscribership, and not to generate greater subscribership 
otherwise depressed by regulatory restrictions. This explanation says that as connections were expected to 
increase, regulators determined that bundling prohibitions were no longer needed. Hence, deregulation 
would occur simultaneously with an increase in consumer demand. Such an explanation that regulators 
were merely anticipating increased uptake is problematic however. The stated intentions of regulators 
indicate that lagging adoption necessitated a change in local law. Unique conditions in Finland and 
Belgium may also weaken the external validity of results for generalization to other jurisdictions. 
Matching of Nordic or Baltic states may provide closer regional and economic comparison. We 
incorporate variation in local conditions with covariates that specify gross domestic product, population 
density, and market concentration to account for regional similarities.   
 
 
5  Results 
 
In the difference-in-differences analysis, we find that output effects were positive in consumer uptake of 
bundled offers relative to unbundled offers in Finland, with mixed results in Belgium.  The case of 
Belgium is described further below.  
                                                 
15 Mobistar Annual Report 2011, http://corporate.mobistar.be/en/pdf/annual_report_2011a_en.pdf; Mobistar, 2013, iPhone 4S – 
16GB wit. http://www.mobistar.be/nl/aanbod/shop/smartphone/iphone-4s-16gb-wit; Martens, John,  Mobistar Won’t Start 
Handset Subsidies Before Law is Enacted. Bloomberg, 22 April, 2010.   
16 Opinion of the Advocate General, Jaaskinen. 2012. Case C-375/11: Belgacom SA, Mobistar SA, KPN Group Belgium SA v. 
Etat Belge. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62011CC0375:EN:HTML.  






In Finland, a dramatic rise in 3G connections over the EU average is seen in the difference-in-differences 
analysis in Table 4.   
 
Finland  EU15/27  Difference  
D/D Coeff. Before After Before After Finland EU15/27 
 (Treatment)  (Control) (2)-(1) (4)-(3) (5)-(6) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
3G, EU 15 1.08 54.93 3.02 40.66 53.85 37.64 16.21** 
  (0.90) (9.14) (0.35) (1.75) (8.24) (1.40) (6.84) 
3G, EU 27 1.08 54.93 2.60 33.10 53.85 30.49 23.36*** 
(0.78) (8.52) (0.28) (1.26) (7.74) (0.98) (6.76) 
ln 3G, EU 15 -0.78 3.71 -0.16 3.42 4.49 3.58 0.92 
  (0.81) (1.65) (0.17) (0.34) (0.84) (0.17) (0.67) 
ln 3G, EU 27 -0.78 3.71 -0.30 3.10 4.49 3.41 1.09 
  (0.77) (1.57) (0.13) (0.27) (0.80) (0.14) (0.66) 
EU 15 Obs. 7 26 146 364 33 510 543 
EU 27 Obs. 7 26 205 675 33 880 913 
 
Table 4.  3G Connections in Finland with Bundling from 2006Q3 – 2012Q4. EU 15/27 controls 
exclude Finland.  Robust standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
   
 
Columns (1) and (2) include the before and after levels in 3G connections and ln 3G connections for 
Finland.  Columns (3) and (4) include the before and after data for EU 15/27 control groups excluding 
Finland.  Columns (5) and (6) include mean estimates for the differences by subtracting the before level 
from the after level of 3G subscribers.  Column (7) indicates the difference-in-differences estimator as the 
difference in means by subtracting the EU difference from the Finnish treatment group.   
 
The estimated increase in Finland of 3G connections over the EU 15/27 average in the after period of 
2006Q3 to 2012Q4 is shown in Column (7) as 16.21 connections per 100 people over the EU 15 average, 
and 23.36 connections per 100 people over the EU 27 average.  These are statistically significant and 
positive differences, with R2 values 0.382 and 0.283 respectively.  The null hypothesis, H0: β3 = 0, is 
rejected here, and the alternative hypothesis, H1: β3 ≠ 0 is accepted.  Similar results are seen in ln 3G 
connections.  The difference-in-differences estimator in Column (7) says that ln 3G connections rose in 
Finland, 0.92 and 1.09, more than in the EU 15 and EU 27.  These are not statistically significant 
increases, albeit positive, however.  R2 values are 0.611 and 0.559.  The null hypothesis, H0: β3 = 0, cannot 
be rejected.  An important explanation for this result in the difference in ln 3G connections is the short 
time period before the policy change from 2003Q1 to 2006Q2 where 3G connections were as low as 1 to 3 
connections per 100 people.  In a natural log transformation, the growth rates are much steeper in the early 
period, than the later, where each incremental connection accounts for a high percentage of growth from 





5.2  Belgium 
 
In Belgium, the penetration of 3G connections is below the EU average measured by difference-in-
differences, as seen in Table 5.   
 
Belgium  EU15/27  Difference 
D/D Coeff. 
Before After Before After Belgium EU15/27 
 (Treatment)  (Control) (2)-(1) (4)-(3) (5)-(6) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
3G, EU 15 4.82 32.41 18.68 66.86 27.59 48.18 -20.59*** 
  (2.42) (7.88) (0.97) (3.01) (5.46) (2.03) (3.43) 
3G, EU 27 4.82 32.41 15.27 55.49 27.59 40.22 -12.63*** 
(1.92) (6.62) (0.66) (2.21) (4.70) (1.54) (3.16) 
ln 3G, EU 15 0.31 3.45 1.87 4.15 3.13 2.28 0.85* 
  (0.54) (1.10) (0.11) (0.22) (0.55) (0.11) (0.44) 
ln 3G, EU 27 0.31 3.45 1.71 3.94 3.13 2.22 0.91** 
  (0.50) (1.02) (0.08) (0.16) (0.52) (0.08) (0.43) 
EU 15 Obs. 25 10 368 140 35 508 543 
EU 27 Obs. 25 10 618 260 35 878 913 
 
Table 5.  3G Connections in Belgium with Bundling from 2010Q3 – 2012Q4. EU 15/27 controls 
exclude Belgium. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***p<0.01 **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
 
 
Column (7) shows a difference-in-differences estimator of -20.59 connections per 100 people and -12.63 
connections per 100 people over the EU 15 and EU 27 average.  These are statistically significant and 
negative differences, with R2 values 0.570 and 0.508 respectively.  The null hypothesis, H0: β3 = 0, is not 
rejected here. Examination of equation (2) indicates a different result, however.  The estimator in Column 
(7) says that ln 3G connections rose in Belgium by 0.85 and 0.91, above the EU 15 and EU 27.  These are 
statistically significant increases and the null hypothesis, H0: β3 = 0, is rejected, and the alternative 
hypothesis, H1: β3 ≠ 0 is accepted, with R
2 values 0.276 and 0.293. An important explanation of this result 
is the rate of change in Belgium over time.  The change in ln 3G connections exceeded that of the EU 
average.  In a natural log transformation, regressions provide a view of growth that incorporates relative 
changes over time.  In Belgium, the severe lag in 3G adoption below its EU 15 peers warrant closer 
analysis due to local events in bundling constraints.  Several reasons can explain the unusual deficit in 
Belgian uptake.  The six-month maximum on the length of subscription contracts may give rise to a partial 
deregulation of bundling restrictions given the 12 to 24-month international practice.  The delay by 
Belgian operators to implement handset subsidies after 2012 also may explain Belgian outcomes.   
 
 
6    Conclusion 
 
These two episodes in Europe demonstrate output effects from handset bundling policy. We find that the 
bundling of handsets and mobile service does not have negative consumer welfare effects in 3G 
penetration rates in Finland and mixed results in Belgium. We see that bundling appears to allow firms to 
realize efficiency gains and increase consumer adoption of 3G connections. In the opinions of European 
regulators, trends in the wireless marketplace required policy reversals to improve consumer adoption of 
3G subscriptions between 2003 and 2012. Natural experiments in Finland and Belgium appear to suggest 




7 Appendix: Data Sources and Descriptive Statistics 
 
Wireless Intelligence Database: Our main source of data was the Wireless Intelligence database of the 
GSM Association, London, United Kingdom. This data includes 1,080 observations of quarterly data for 
3G mobile connections in 27 EU countries. EU 15 countries with greater mean quarterly GDP between 
2003 and 2012 include: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
United Kingdom, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, in millions of euro 
(from 1.1.1999), code namq_gdp_c, not seasonally adjusted data, at current prices, from Eurostat, 2013, 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/ portal/page/portal/national_accounts/data/database.  3G Connections: 
Third-generation (3G) network technologies include, CDMA2000 1xEV-DO, CDMA2000 1xEV-DO 
Rev. A, CDMA2000 1xEV-DO Rev. B, WCDMA, WCDMA HSPA, and TD-SCDMA. A connection is 
registered on a mobile network at the end of the period for 3G unique SIM cards (or phone numbers, 
where SIM cards are not used).  Covariates: 2G Connections: Second-generation (2G) network 
technologies include cdmaOne, CDMA2000 1X, GSM, PDC, PHS, iDEN, and TDMA. Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index: Quarterly measure of market concentration from 0 (even competition) to 10,000 (no 
competition). Population: Quarterly population data, from United Nations, Population Division World 
Population Prospects, for all residents at the end of each period. GDP in PPS: Eurostat provides GDP per 
capita in Purchasing Power Standards (PPS), code tec00114, 2003 to 2012, indexed by EU28=100 and 
EU27=100, http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/purchasing_power_parities/data/main_ 
tables. Population Density: Calculated from quarterly population data and country area in square 
kilometers from the World Bank World Development Indicators (WDI) database, 2013. 
 
 
Description Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
3G Connections per 100 913 26.63 25.82 0.00 118.62
2G Connections per 100 1,080 88.82 20.35 23.98 146.17
HHI 1,080 3707 781 2226 6544
GDP in PPS 1,080 98 43 31 275
Population 1,080 18,400,000 22,700,000 404,151 82,500,000
Density (Pop / Sq. Km.) 1,080 170 238 15 1312
 
Table 6.  Descriptive Statistics for 27 countries over 40 quarters from 2003Q1 – 2012Q4. Source: 
Wireless Intelligence Database, 2013 and Eurostat, 2013. 
 
Country EU 15 3G 2G HHI GDP Population Density 
Austria Yes 37.7 82.3 3104 127      8,311,836  99 
Belgium Yes 12.7 88.1 3580 119    10,566,781  346 
Finland Yes 43.5 88.6 3519 116      5,307,339  16 
France Yes 21.2 64.8 3737 109    61,925,864  113 
Germany Yes 20.6 89.5 2973 117    82,383,817  231 
Greece Yes 33.9 96.8 3401 89    11,274,426  85 
Romania No 18.5 68.4 3725 42    21,625,851  91 
Spain Yes 30.1 79.1 3505 102    44,747,755  89 
Sweden Yes 47.0 75.2 3328 125      9,213,595  20 
United Kingdom Yes 30.3 83.0 2461 116    61,176,065  251 
 
Table 7.   Mean Values for select countries from 2003Q1 – 2012Q4. Source: Wireless Intelligence 
Database, 2013, Eurostat, 2013, World Bank World Development Indicators (WDI), 
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